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ABSTRACT 
 
Why does a certain metropolitan area grow more than another?  The answer to this question 
has evaded much of the considerable body of scholarship on the topic.  One problem may be 
that some of the frameworks that drive empirical research in this field tend be based on ad hoc 
combinations of explanatory factors, ranging from natural climate to business climate to land 
and labor costs.  Theoretical approaches emphasize differences in economic specialization: 
some activities have higher rates of growth than others, and this translates into divergence in 
medium-term rates of inter-urban growth and income.  But specialization itself needs to be 
explained.  International economics has adopted theoretical frameworks for explaining 
different growth rates and income levels among countries involving multiple causes and their 
potentially recursive interactions.  Three main forces are at the heart of this literature:  
specialization, labor force and human capital issues, and institutions.  This framework can be 
fruitfully adapted to the analysis of metropolitan growth and change.  The thorniest aspect of 
doing so is to consider recursive relationships among the three in a dynamic model, where 
specialization, human capital and institutions are endogenous to the explanation, and where 
causality can reverse over time in complex sequences.  In this paper, we lay out the elements 
of such an approach and argue that it could serve as the basis for a new generation of research 
on differences in metropolitan growth processes.  
JEL:  R11, R58, R23, J24, H73 
  
                                                 
1
 Michael Storper, Centre de Sociologie des Organisations and Master of Public Affairs, Institut d’Etudes 
Politiques de Paris, 13, rue de l’Université, 75007 Paris France/ michael.storper@sciences-po.fr and Department 
of Geography, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A2AE, UK/ m.storper@lse.ac.uk 
 2 
 
 
Introduction 
 Theories of metropolitan growth and development, despite their long and venerable 
tradition, have lagged behind the major recent advances in theories of economic growth in 
general.  One reason for this is that urban economies2 are extremely open, so that they are 
strongly influenced by national growth and national institutions. Even with this, however, 
growth and development processes for cities are highly uneven; in most countries, growth 
levels and per capita incomes exhibit strong and persistent differences across metropolitan 
areas.  Moreover, even in countries with the highest levels of internal factor mobility, there 
are strong differences in the composition of activity among cities (Glaeser, Scheinkman and 
Schleifer, 1995; Drennan et al 1996), which seem to generate income differences.  This 
probably means that convergence models of city growth face the same limited match to the 
facts as do convergence models of international economic growth  .  
 Whereas in international economics, the limitations to convergence have stimulated a 
fruitful theoretical debate about the forces for non-convergence and differentiation, and in 
urban economics, there is a smaller literature devoted to this problem (Sala-i-Martin, 2002; 
Barro, 1996; Trefler, 1993).3  The bulk of studies of why some city-regions have higher 
income levels, or more overall growth than others,  employ a method best described as 
inductive empiricism.  The modal study of “why this or that city grew or did not grow” is to 
measure a list of factors supposed to contribute to growth.  At the top of the list is usually 
economic specialization, measured usually through shift-share analysis.  A city grows by 
getting more of a sector, or when the sector grows faster in the city than at the national level. 
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Statistical extensions of the specialization theme include export-base models and multipliers.  
A mix of factors such as labor costs, land costs, regulation, business climates and so on, are 
then adduced as explanations for why the city does well or poorly via the evolution of its 
economic base (cf. Glaeser and Shapiro, 2001; Glaeser et al 1992; Glaeser et al 1995). 
 The big problem with these studies is that these latter factors cannot be assumed to be 
causal explanations. There is a correlation between labor and especially land costs and where 
an activity locates within a metropolitan regions (expensive in the center, cheaper in the 
“periphery”).  There is also a correlation between labor and land costs and which types of 
activities go to which types of cities, which mirrors international specialization patterns 
between high-wage/capital intensive places and low-wage labor-intensive places.  As such, 
these costs matter in explaining why New York, San Francisco and London have little durable 
goods manufacturing, while certain cities in the Deep South of the USA or southern Europe 
have a lot of it.  But there isn’t any relationship to why an activity locates in one particular 
city or another within a class of structurally-similar cities; for example, they cannot account 
for why San Francisco has so much more high tech than Los Angeles with this kind of 
reasoning.   And while in general, there is higher productivity in high-cost places, there are no 
strong inter-urban locational adjustments of shares according to real productivity differences 
for a given activity – productivity within sectors seems to be endogenous to the places where 
they are already concentrated (Sveikauskas, 1975).  Only for sectors that are deconcentrating 
does inter-urban productivity comparison seem to make a difference for where they are 
subsequently located, in a different class of cities.  And once again, it cannot tell us which 
cities in that class will get the activity.  
 Neoclassical general-equilibrium models of urban economic growth have more 
theoretical sophistication than the empiricist-accounting type studies, but their assumptions 
are largely unsuited to explaining urban growth, in general or in particular.  The closer they 
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get to pure general equilibrium modeling, the more they lose the ability to explain urban 
concentration and specialization – the heart of urban economies (Krugman, 1991a).  The 
fundamental theorem of neoclassical economics is fundamentally incompatible with “second 
nature” urbanization – i.e. created from within the economy, rather than from accidents of 
location due to harbors or seacoasts – because there would be no spatial concentration in the 
seamless world it assumes (Fujita and Thisse, 2002).   
 Explaining spatial concentration is precisely the strong suit of the one part of urban 
economics that has made big theoretical progress in recent years, the New Economic 
Geography (Fujita, 2002; Krugman, 1991a).  Moreover, it allows us to show why, say, an 
extremely expensive high-wage city-region such as San Francisco can continue to grow in 
high-technology: the factor cost increases are outstripped by the endogeneous increases in 
efficiency of the activities concentrated there. Specialization is driven by this endogenous 
formation and acceleration of agglomeration economies (Rosenthal and Strange, 2001). 
 However, the NEG cannot tell us why, in the first place, any particular metropolitan 
region gets set along the path of specializing in something – such as high tech in San 
Francisco or financial services in London or entertainment in Los Angeles – as opposed to 
another.  That’s where urban growth studies tend to fall back on very specific ad hoc 
explanations (Stanford University for SF, or good weather in LA, for example) or excessively 
general explanations such as business climate or factor costs.   Agglomeration economics can 
tell us why, once an industry gets launched in a place, it tends to keep growing for a long 
time, with strong path dependencies.  Economists have called this the “history matters” part of 
the growth process (Krugman, 1991b).  But they still cannot tell us about historical origins in 
one particular place versus another.  These are relegated to the domain of accidents or specific 
detailed sequences that are said to not be amenable to theoretical generalization (Krugman, 
1999). 
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 Moreover, even with the considerable new insights from the economics of 
agglomeration, the medium-to-long-run evolution of urban economies remains mostly beyond 
our grasp.  Even the most successfully specialized urban economies ultimately run into 
problems, and this is because the industries in which they are specialized ultimately either 
have no further agglomeration economies, or they de-agglomerate, or their products become 
technologically obsolete (Norton and Rees, 1979). All urban economies, like their national 
counterparts -- in the presence of technological change and an open trading regime – are faced 
with the question of adjustment to change. This adjustment comes essentially through sectoral 
succession: successfully getting new specializations, or retaining the retainable parts of 
existing specializations, to compensate the ultimate loss of what they have .  
 It will not do to try and loop back to fully neoclassical (i.e. general equilibrium spatial 
economics) explanations of this process, either;  such models are closed by claiming that the 
optimal adjustments will happen, that new or changing activities will go to places according 
to their relative productivity rankings, and that this will determine how  the specializations of 
cities will evolve through time. Since standard models can’t explain the “why” of 
agglomeration in the first place, they have little to say about changes in the specializations of 
specific places over time (Storper and Scott, 1997).    
 Comparative growth theory, mostly as applied to international growth and 
development comparisons over the medium- to long-run, has made significant progress in this 
area.  It stresses the long-run adaptive capacity of economies, in relationship to the changes in 
technology and geography that alter the competition of places for different activities (Rodrik, 
2007).  Thus, it addresses the question raised above, about how economies sustain or do not 
sustain growth over some period of time, in the face of structural changes -- the capacity to 
pull through cycles and renew economic growth, both quantitatively and qualitatively 
(incomes) (Haussman and Rodrik, 2003; Pritchett, 1997).  Failure comes when an urban 
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region either has a shrinking economy, or when it quantitatively grows but its incomes, in 
absolute or relative terms, decline.  The task then becomes two-fold.  First,  is there some way 
to explain the origins of successful specialization among metropolitan regions in a similar 
structural class of regions? Second, given the inevitability of change in the locational patterns 
of sectors in such a region’s economic base, why do some places seem to do better at 
adjustment than others, effectively changing their specializations over time?. What might such 
an explanatory framework look like ?  
 
Three principal sources of long-run urban development 
  
 As noted, economic geography has potent theories of why and when sectors will 
geographically concentrate, and why they leave or disperse: these are the theories of 
agglomeration based on internal trade costs, home market effects and possibly localized 
technological externalities.  In any event,  when sectors are concentrated in certain regions, 
they cause the economies of those regions to be specialized in those activities, leaving a 
strong imprint in terms of the quantity and quality (type of jobs and local expenditures) of 
growth.  As a recent indicator of this, Galbraith and Hale (2004) note that the income gained 
in just four (out of about three thousand) US counties in the late 1990s is sufficient to account 
for virtually all of the increase in geographical income inequality in the USA in the 1990s!  
These counties are, needless to say, the cores of the US high-tech boom.  Some analysts of 
agglomeration economies believe that localization and specialization are forces that, in the 
medium-term, impede geographical income convergence.   
As alluded to above, most standard economic theory  is not fully comfortable with the 
notion that “specialization matters” over the long run at the international level, because it 
believes in factor proportions adjustments to economies that ultimately “wash out” the 
importance of sectoral specialization for national incomes (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2001).  
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But while this may (and we should emphasize the conditional, because it is not firmly 
established) be true in the very long run,  there is also agreement that specialization can 
differentiate economies in the short run, and that difference (and non-convergence) can be 
prolonged through a succession of different specializations.  Why? Sectors or activites at 
different points in their developmental cycles are characterized by different factor proportions 
and changes in them (labor versus capital-intensive, for example) (Trefler, 1993; Norton and 
Rees, 1979).  More importantly, they can have different terms of trade with the rest of the 
economy, according to whether there is import or export-biased growth in the economies with 
which the city trades (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2001).  Newer or more innovative sectors can 
earn temporary rents on their outputs, which they can then renew through innovation.  
Growing sectors generally have technological frontiers that are pushing outward at a higher-
rate than older industries, so the firms in them enjoy more innovation opportunities. 
Moreover, in sectors with growing overall demand and supply that doesn’t keep up in the 
short run, not only is there a rent-effect, but it’s difficult for any supplier to have a decisive 
impact on prices, so the places that specialize don’t undermine their own positions easily, as 
they do in sectors with easily-expandable supply (growth based on more mature or 
standardized products).  The point is: specialization really does matter because it creates 
significant rents for places in the medium-run, due to monopolistic competition.4 
Cities can also be specialized in a way that makes them poorer than the average, but 
this is generally because they have specializations that are not based on agglomeration 
economies (strong endogenous forces of proximity).  Localization should be the result of 
strong endogenous forces of proximity in the economy.  Three of these are in the intermediate 
output structure of sectors:  inter-firm transactions; labor pooling; and technological 
spillovers.  A fourth concerns the home market effect of concentrating producers and 
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consumers who each maximize the benefits of economies of scale and product variety when 
trade costs are strongly positive, by concentrating together.  All of these could generate rents 
for their host areas and make them richer than average.  But one can imagine also that 
economic activities that have none of these locational processes find themselves together in a 
certain city or region simply because it has the right factor supply for that sector (say land, or 
labor or transportation access).  This form of development is not agglomerated specialization 
(with monopolistic competition), but simply a collections of firms in a single industry. Thus, 
not all high location quotients indicate true specialization in the sense theorized by the New 
Economic Geography.   Rapidly growing cities may have specificity of their economic bases, 
but without the advantages of specialization noted above.  The fast-growing cities in the US 
interior West (generally low income, low wage) have few agglomeration economies in high-
wage sectors; the slower-growing cities of the Northeast have higher incomes and more 
specificity based on specialization, with the attendant benefits (Drennan, 2002).5 
Growth theory doesn’t stop with specialization in explaining different economic fates 
of places.  The second major axis of growth theory holds that the reason a given stock of 
economic resources can produce more and more wealth over time from increases in 
productivity that come from the application of new and better knowledge to production.  In 
turn, this knowledge is embodied in people, and can be measured as the stock of human 
capital.6 This human capital becomes an externality for the economy, because knowledge can 
be recombined and re-used in many different ways; it tends to have an ever-increasing 
positive impact on productivity (Romer, 1990).    In international comparisons, knowledge 
can grow because of increases in R&D, because of investments in education, or due to 
improvements in the incentives to apply and exchange information.  But most important are 
the conditions that allow the re-use and re-combination of knowledge in order to generate a 
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non-linear and positive effect in creating new knowledge.  There is little agreement about 
whether such conditions come from the general institutional environment, from the design of 
the R&D system, or from more general incentive structures. 
It has been famously observed by Lucas (1988) that skilled people congregate in 
expensive cities to be near other skilled people.  But the literature is silent as to why some 
cities do this better than others, giving rise to big differences in human capital and associated 
income levels.  Even though globalization has made international flows of knowledge more 
and more open, regions in a country such as the US remain much more open than national 
economies: they have more interregional trade and labor flows than do even the most open 
national economies.  This means that the stock of knowledge of any given city-region is 
intimately related to national education, R&D, and labor migration between regions.  But the 
region may influence internal choices to stay or leave, as well as who is trained inside the 
region.  Thus, the regional human capital stock at any given point in time is, in part, caused by 
the regional characteristics that attract, retain, and repel people with different kinds of skills.  
But, as we shall see, not much is known about these regional forces. 
The third major branch of international growth theory argues that institutions 
determine long-run economic growth (Rodrik et al, 2004; cf. Glaeser et al, 2004; Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson 2004).  By “institutions” is meant a variety of things, ranging from the 
ways the formal de jure rules of political institutions affect their efficiency in facilitating 
economic activity, to what we might call de facto governance, referring to the real, on-the-
ground ways that public sector agencies and private sector groups and individuals interact in 
detailed ways to shape the rules and resources of the economy (North, 2006).  Let’s now 
define more precisely what this theme might mean to the study of metropolitan growth.  
Three fundamental areas of institutional performance are at the center of growth 
theory. The ways that institutions shape the microeconomic environment (including what is 
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commonly called the “business climate”,  covering such things as confidence and the ways it 
affects transactions, discounting and investment levels); the ways that they shape labor force 
participation and effort levels (sometimes known as the “social policy environment”); and the 
ways that they shape problem-solving, which determines how well the economy captures new 
opportunities or misses them (how it adjusts to changing technologies and competitors). There 
is no precise institutional blueprint for these features; rather they represent outcomes for 
which there are many functional equivalents, depending on the context. They are not a 
formula, but a sense of what institutions for growth actually do to sustain growth (Rodrik, 
2007). 
 International comparisons are easier when it comes to the formal dimensions of 
institutions, because international borders of sovereign countries are “hard” institutional 
boundaries.  Regions in some countries – mostly centralized ones --share many of the de jure 
institutions of economic governance, whereas in other, less centralized ones, de jure 
institutional design from one city-region to another can differ. And they surely differ from one 
country to another (Djankov et al 2003).   
Another aspect of research of comparative international research on institutions is the 
size of governmental units.  Political economists have recently theorized that there are 
tradeoffs between the efficiencies that can be gained from size of jurisdictions, and the losses 
generated (Alesina and Spolaore, 2005). The bigger the unit, the more likelihood there is that 
there are more heterogeneous preferences of the people within it, and hence the likelihood that 
many of those preferences will get “washed out” in the conflicts and compromises that must 
take place in big jurisdictions. In international growth studies, the performance of countries 
can be partially attributed to how successfully they combine the advantages of scale while 
enjoying sufficient convergence of preferences to be able to make strong decisions that have 
public support (Alesina and Spolaore, 2005). To my knowledge, there is no existing study of 
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such differences in the distribution of formal governmental competencies within metropolitan 
regions, the resulting size structure of jurisdictions, and the consequences of this for the ways 
metropolitan political processes operate. 
 Moreover, city-regions appear often to have strong de facto differences in their 
inherited (de facto) political cultures and forms of political mobilization that contribute to 
governance outcomes, in the same way that scholars have seen these among countries.   Some 
have longer traditions of intense community action and established patterns of government-
business-community cooperation there, while others have much more top-down political 
cultures, for example  (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Molotch, 1976).  “Social capital” indices, 
that measure such patterns of participation, show that there is much more participation in 
some city-regions than in others, though the meaning of his for political outcomes has not yet 
been established by research (Putnam, 2000). 
 In the regional development literature, a great deal has been said about institutions, but 
usually in a different sense from the growth theory literature.  Analysts have been interested 
in the sector-specific institutions that make a region able to help a particular industry to 
flourish.  This is especially the case with respect to high technology clusters and flexible 
production networks and “innovation-based” sectors (Saxenian, 1994; Becattini, 1990).   
Questions about how production networks are coordinated, moral hazards contained, and 
transactions costs minimized, as well as whether sector-specific public goods are provided, 
are the object of a vibrant literature (Scott, 1993).  When the concerns of these two literatures 
are brought together, they suggest the interesting question of how the broad  institutional 
structure of a region interacts with its sector-specific institutions, such as business 
associations, labor market networks, relationships to the educational system of the region, and 
other formal institutions and actor-networks. 
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The opposite direction of causality has also been considered: sectoral interests may 
shape the performance of general political institutions and political markets for ideas and 
programs in the region. This is the point of much of the urban politics literature (Dahl,  1961; 
Cox, 1993). Powerful interests shape the choices made about urban development, especially 
in land use, through the place-based politics of landowner and developer groups (urban 
growth regimes) (Molotch, 1976).  This has been extended to sectoral business elites as well, 
in the notion that they influence local politics through their ability to influence job creation 
and hence generate revenue for local and regional governments.  In this way, sectional 
preferences can find broad expression through lobbying, interest-peddling, and other means of 
dominating the resource-allocation and policy-setting processes.  
 The conception of institutions that we propose to import from growth theory is broader 
than in most of the urban politics literature.  It asks how both formal rules and the de facto 
political processes capture, retain, or damage economic development (Persson and Tabellini, 
2006; Rodrik et al 2004; Glaeser, et al 2004).  Moreover, there should be microeconomic 
effects of institutions, not merely how they affect the political decision-making and resource 
allocation processes.  These outcomes include the ways institutions mobilize private and 
public actors, and filter others out (dis-incentives).   They may do so through the ways they 
influence the formation of coalitions and their intentional, strategic problem-solving activities, 
or their unintentional mobilizing and de-mobilizing effects on dispersed private actors. 
Though elite processes and deliberate use of public power to extract rents and build things are 
important, so are complex, dispersed collective action problems such as how actor-networks 
are formed, supported, and sometimes weakened or eliminated.7 
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 It is important to note that at the inter-national scale, there is now a body of (imperfect) large-scale empirical 
testing of different hypotheses about how institutions affect growth and performance (Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2004; Prezeworski et al, 2000).  At the inter-regional scale, however, while there is an enormous 
literature, it is almost entirely qualitative or case-study based; we lack any systematic evidence that institutions, 
politics and governance at the regional level actually matter to regional economic performance in the medium- to 
long-run.  This is astonishing, given the political attention, money and effort spent on such issues. 
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 Thus, a first way to pull together these insights from international and comparative 
growth theory, and attempt a first application to the problem identified -- how to explain why 
certain metropolitan regions do better at growth than others -- looks like the following: 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Economic growth 
and performance: 
Innovation, wages, 
per cap income, 
growth 
Specialization: composition of the economy 
(New Economic Geography) 
Human capital: immigration, retention, loss 
(New Growth Theory) 
Institutions: formal structures, de facto 
governance :  
(Institutionalist Political Economy) 
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Interactions: endogenous causes, feedbacks, filters 
 
 Taking comparative economics and economic growth theories seriously, as a mdoel 
for why a city-region grows would require that we do more than merely consider the three 
forces identified above.  Their interactions must also be considered.   By interactions we 
mean what economics calls “endogenous” forces, or what most people would call “chicken 
and egg” issues. In somewhat more technical terms, this means that each of the three 
independent variables (causes) identified above can – under some circumstances --  become 
dependent variables (effects of one another), and that they can do so in more than one cycle, 
thus reversing the direction of causality more than once over the medium-run.  
 
 
 
What causes specialization?  
 
If one city  has had more favorable evolution of its specializations than another, is this 
because its labor force development (human capital) has became progressively more oriented 
toward certain skills than the other’s, so that these cities attract and sustain different 
industries?   A standard version of this argument is that specialization responds to factor 
endowments – in this case particular kinds of human capital.  In the case of high-skill 
industries, it is difficult to reconcile abundance to lower relative prices of the abundant factor, 
however.  New Economic Geography models do better on this account, via labor pooling 
models: search and matching within a large pool of both labor and employers, allows firms to 
minimize labor hoarding and better manage their total labor costs, while allowing workers to 
better secure jobs, manage change, and build their career-long skills (Jayet, 1983 ;  Combes 
and Duranton, 2006).   
Alternatively, as is argued in much of the growth theory literature, specialization is the 
result of institutions, which ‘select’ the environment to favor certain activities over others, in 
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the long run.  Thus, institutions either “capture” favorable opportunities or they fail to do so 
(“repel” them);  and they either allow the economy to adapt to changing external 
circumstances, or they block adaptation. Institutions can capture more or less favorable 
specializations (Rodrik, Subramanian, Trebbi, 2004).  
Some scholars argue, by contrast, that specialization is largely accidental:  being in the 
right place at the right time attracts a sector to a place, and from there, forces described by 
economic geographers “lock the activity into” the place, through agglomeration economies.  
In this view, then, the causes of specialization are external or ‘exogenous”  (Scott and Storper, 
1997; Krugman, 1991a; Davis and Weinstein, 2002).   One can think of a combination of 
these two latter views:  thus, accidents either give or take away initial “seeds” of 
specialization, but institutions then promote adaptation or fail at it, in which case they drive 
initially favorable accidents away.  This type of continuous adaptation is said to involve the 
sector-specific institutions mentioned above, that solve the problems of the sector, but may 
equally require measures that affect a number of sectors or impact the regional environment in 
general: hence the need for problem-solving coalitions that go beyond what an industry is able 
to do for itself (Scott, 1993). 
Another point to bear in mind is that the potential for specialization is always partially 
independent of any “intra-regional” forces: it simply has to do with the evolving 
organizational and trade cost structure of the industry in question.  As is suggested in a highly 
simplified way by product cycle models, there is a moment in the life of some industries when 
they are reorganized and their internal trade costs decline to the point that no local measures 
can suffice to maintain their core agglomerations and hence nothing will keep them in 
expensive places (Norton and Rees, 1979).  On the other hand, there are some moments in the 
organizational life of sectors where regional efficiency can be improved and shares of an 
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industry retained: however, this is usually through innovation within that industry and still 
involves shedding a lot of the routine production activity (Saxenian, 1994; Amsden, 1989).  
These endogeneity issues with respect to regional specialization can be visualized in 
the following manner: 
 
 
 
What causes skills/human capital stock? 
 
Institutions and specialization might also be causes of the human capital stock of a 
city-region.  Overall, some regions are richer and more educated than others, and they 
reproduce some of this in situ, but they also reinforce differences through differential 
migration. In addition to ethnic specificity of foreign immigration, and sometimes overlapping 
with it, regions attract mixes of domestic and foreign immigrants with different skill levels 
and qualities (Frey, 1995).  Linked to this is the retention of highly-skilled individuals trained 
in situ. Among regions with excellent research and training institutions, some will retain more 
of their locally highly trained immigrants than others, and some will attract more of the highly 
trained from elsewhere than others.   Does this ultimately affect their specializations and 
specialization: 
clustering, 
reinforcement, 
weakening 
 
Human capital: 
Immigration, selection of labor, 
retention, skilling, pooling 
Accidents:   
Regional innovators in right place at 
right time: capture new activities : first 
movers win, others lose 
Institutions: favorable to capture and 
retention of  activities 
Growth and 
performance 
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innovativeness?  Could it be that something about politics and governance in each region 
systematically selects for different quantities and qualities of immigration?  
 In the recent urban growth literature, much has been made of the twin notions of 
“creative cities” and “amenity-based cities.”  (Florida, 2002;  Glaeser et al 2001).   Both are 
stories  of economic development driven by human capital. In the creative cities framework, 
specialization is driven by the attraction of creative workers (whose main component are 
highly-educated workers generally, with a high proportion working in high technology and 
finance).  These workers in turn are said to accumulate in places because of the amenity of 
“tolerance,” which is operationalized through the composite variable “diversity.”  The 
“amenity city” argument generalizes this to both highly-educated populations (high culture 
amenities and bohemian amenities) and less-educated populations (sun, low density).  The 
problem with  human capital-driven regional economic growth models is that skilled people 
appear in most cases to precede the creation of  amenities, not principally to follow them.  
Moreover,  successful cities are so heterogeneous in terms of their amenities (Shanghai versus 
Atlanta, Boston versus Orlando), that the notion of amenities easily becomes a vacuous 
tautology as it is stretched over more and more heterogeneous cases.  Household preferences 
for residential amenities do seem to drive specific locational choices within metropolitan 
regions, but not between them, so they generate intra-metropolitan sorting but not regional 
development as a whole (Cheshire and Sheppard, 1995; Oates, 1969; Hilber and Mayer, 
2004). 
 We earlier noted that labor pooling versions of agglomeration theory can be 
interpreted as suggesting that big labor pools facilitate specialization (Combes and Duranton, 
2006).  But it could also work the other way around.  If an industry begins to agglomerate in a 
region, and it has unstable markets due to rapid growth or technological change or product 
innovation/differentiation, then it is highly desirable for firms to have access to a large pool of 
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labor, because this makes it easier for them to turnover their labor, by insuring that when 
demand grows they can find the kind of labor they need in a short time (Jayet, 1983). Thus, 
the clustering together of many such firms with unstable labor demands might generate the 
regional labor pool  through in-migration or regional learning-by-doing, and then the two 
become mutually reinforcing causes (Scott and Storper, 1987).   In terms of explaining the 
trajectories of places, we are caught in very complex endogeneity dynamics in which the 
putatively independent and dominant role of human capital is far from being established. 
 A picture of these endogeneity issues with respect to labor supply is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
What shapes regional institutional performance? 
 
 The possible influence of regional institutions, politics, and policy on economic 
development has received a great deal of attention in the literature, but there is little that 
operationalizes and measures these relations.8 
                                                 
8
 One of the most ambitious attempts to date is by Rodriguez Pose, 1998, but he does not directly measure policy 
outcomes and actions, but rather background proxies for institutions. 
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The formal (de jure) structure of institutions and hence their formal authority and 
processes for exercising it is determined by constitutional structure, history, and law. The de 
facto institutional environment consists of the real behaviors of different groups – 
governmental, business, community and electoral constituencies.  Among the factors that 
might underlie changes in de facto institutional performance are  human capital and 
specialization.  If immigration is strong, and immigrant populations become politically 
mobilized, for example, they may change the preferences that are expressed through political 
decisions in areas that influence regional development (education, training, infrastructure, 
business rules, fiscal policy).9  Likewise, if economic specializations change, then the 
business groups that effectively “leave” the region will have weaker voices, and the business 
groups associated with new or stronger sectors will, presumably, have more influence on 
decisions affecting development (Cox, 1993; Molotch, 1976; Dahl, 2005).  If business and 
human capital actor-networks that represent powerful specializations in the region mobilize 
around particular strategies, they may influence the output of regional government institutions 
in a variety of ways (this is the classical point made by the urban politics/growth machine 
literature).  However, it’s important to note two things for a view of the sources of 
institutional performance:  many different types of actor-networks are likely to be involved; 
and the ways they get their ideas heard depends in part on the formal structure of institutions. 
In the metropolitan context, key aspects of this are the degree of fragmentation and the size of 
units in which politics takes place, as this will affect the costs of achieving consensus and 
hence the formation of the “market” for ideas and strategies that affect the economy, notably 
in the domain of problem-solving.  
  The endogeneity  issues with respect to institutions are shown below in simplified 
form: 
                                                 
9
 Literature on earlier machine politics deals with this issue (Erie, 1990), but the more recent literature seems to 
pay less attention to it. 
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 It should by now be clear that all three of the main pillars of a growth theory – the 
economic geography of production, human capital, and institutions – are likely to be 
important causes of regional growth and development, but that they may be both independent 
and intermediate causes of a regional growth trajectory.  Only additional detailed theoretical 
modeling and empirical measurement will determine how much each contributes to the 
explanation of regional development and growth, and how they interact.  
 
Improving the analysis of institutions and regional economic performance 
 In international comparative growth studies, institutions have taken an increasingly 
prominent role.  At the same time, “institutions” refers to many things, lending a high degree 
of complexity to methods and results.  Politics, institutions, and “governance” have also been 
important reference points in the literature on cities and regions.  Because this is the most 
complex and heterogeneous of the three main pillars of growth theory, it behoves us now to 
devote greater attention to institutions in the metropolitan or regional context.   
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One classical theme in urban growth studies is the influence of central government 
spending on regional growth.  Treated in a simple empirical-descriptive way, this amounts to 
an “external” or “exogenous” cause of local economic change.  In light of the present 
discussion, such a stance is questionable.  Central government spending  in regions is 
generally motivated by political coalitions of regional interests that function in national 
institutions.  Technology is also cited as an exogenous factor.  Glaeser and Shapiro (2001) 
argue that the interstate highway system and air conditioning are key reasons for the 
development of sprawling, sunny cities in the USA.  But this explanation has a difficult time 
explaining why textile mills already moved south in the 1930s, before the advent of air-
conditioning, or why dense urban centers and cold old cities resurged in the 1990s (Storper 
and Manville, 2006).  
 These specific issues aside, as argued above, the core issue about institutions is how 
they might affect long-run specialization of a regional economy, and adjustments of the 
economic base in the face of technological change, globalization, fragmentation of production 
chains, and so on.    Again as noted, social science does not have a satisfactory answer for 
why an industry might have a strong cluster in a particular place and not another.  It does 
have fairly good answers for why there will be a clustered rather than dispersed structure in an 
industry and why that structure undergoes change, as well as why the clusters will be located 
in a certain general type of economy (developed, high wage, less developed, etc).  As with 
development economics in general, it also lacks fully satisfactory explanations of why some 
places sometimes change structural class, by moving up or down the hierarchy of 
development: just as this happens to countries, so it happens to cities (Rodrik, 2007).  There is 
strong reason to believe that appropriately-constructed institutionalist arguments and evidence 
could advance our ability to explain these processes. 
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 An example will help.  In the late 1950s, it was not clear that an area south of San 
Francisco now known as “Silicon Valley” would become the world center of  information 
technology.  The initial pattern of semiconductor production in the USA was quite dispersed, 
and if there was any nascent geographical center of gravity for the sector, it was the Northeast 
coast, from Boston to New Jersey. Because the industry was extremely new, it lacked  a clear 
“production process” and “commodity chain,” and therefore did not have clearly-defined 
“factor demands” or even linkage patterns.  However, there were a number of areas in the 
USA with a lot of engineers working on what would become the new technology, from 
northern California to southern California to the east coast, and even in the southwest.  This is 
what we previously labeled a “window of locational opportunity” (Scott and Storper, 1987).  
It had parallels in the late 1920s with the American aircraft industry, or the film industry in 
the 1900s. It has parallels with nanotechnology and biotechnology today.  
 The problem is that there are often many places that can satisfy the technical needs of 
an industry.    This may be the case with respect to factor supplies (in the IT example, skilled 
engineers and inventors), as well as institutions.  Some noted analysts of the Silicon Valley 
case (eg Saxenian, 1994) argue that it was Silicon Valley’s institutions that caused it to 
capture the industry and that this generated the specialization it still enjoys today as the 
county with the highest per capita income in the world’s wealthiest economy. But once again, 
we fall into the endogeneity hole:  Boston and Phoenix were also early centers of 
semiconductor production, and it was not until much later that Silicon Valley really pulled 
ahead of them.  In this case, if it is institutions that caused Silicon Valley’s agglomeration 
forces to strengthen, the institutions are endogenously formed in place – they emerged after 
the start of the agglomeration process, as a part of the growth of the industry itself.10 
                                                 
10
 This would also be true of the labor force.  The labor force could not have “caused” the IT industry to 
concentrate in Silicon Valley, because in the 1960s, computer engineering was just a loose set of individuals, not 
a consolidated academic discipline. It is an endogenous outcome of the industry’s development, both as a 
category of skills and training, and as a geographical concentration of those people in Silicon Valley.  
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 The famous “Stanford business park” story could be considered an example of 
“institutional entrepreneurship” (by the dean of the Stanford Business School), and hence an 
institutionalist explanation of why Silicon Valley, as opposed to Boston or Phoenix, got ahead 
(Saxenian, 2000; Kenney, 2000).  In this version of things, Motorola’s massive early 
investments  in Phoenix did not find a favorable institutional environment there, or Motorola 
simply made the wrong strategic choices, and hence the Phoenix agglomeration folded.  But 
this wouldn’t seem to be the case for Boston, which had multiple and diverse actors who saw 
what was  happening and tried to capture the IT industries at the same time SV did.  
Saxenian’s (1994) argument that they did not do so very well is convincing, but it does not 
answer the question of “institutions as chicken” or “institutions as egg.”   
 If the sector-specific institutions we are referring to here are in large-part created as 
part of the specialization process, then the “exogenous” force of accident may be said to be at 
their origins as well.  It’s important to understand what this does and does not mean.  Perhaps 
in the Silicon Valley case, there were many regions that were—more or less – equally well-
prepared to become the world center of the IT industries.  But only one of these “candidate 
regions” happened to get ahead just a little earlier than the others.  This is because some actor 
in that place came up with a break-through “killer application” that tipped the agglomeration 
economies toward that place: by taking market share, suppliers streamed into the Valley to 
fulfill new needs, network efficiencies grew, and other places found themselves out-distanced, 
even though they were “about equally good as one another ”  prior to this tipping point.  The 
extreme version of this story of accidents holds that William Shockley, the inventor of the 
chip, moved to Silicon Valley because he wanted to be closer to his mother, who lived in 
Menlo Park.  This tipped the locational structure of the industry, durably.  This kind of 
“accidents of history” explanation is now incorporated  in the New Economic Geography’s 
basic core-periphery model (Fuchs and Shapira, 2005).  In my opinion, it fits well the case of 
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the aircraft industry in the 1930s, where many localities  in the US or elsewhere were equally 
well-placed to become major centers  of aircraft production, but Los Angeles got ahead 
because of a single event: Donald Douglass invented the DC-3 in Santa Monica, and it “took 
the market” and tipped the geography of aircraft production there rather than elsewhere 
(Scott, 1993). 
 Do these events deserve the analytical status of “fully exogenous accidents?”   On the 
one hand, it is evident that many pre-conditions must be satisfied even to have the  possibility 
of making the right breakthrough and tipping the geography of the sector, capturing the 
specialization.  In this sense, there is a regularity that can be explained by social science.  It is 
a regularity more akin to “climate” than to “today’s weather,” however, and  that is the 
problem.  We do not like path dependencies and branching points in social science, because 
they create a wedge between broad and deep structural conditions and outcomes (Hodgson, 
1993).  But that may very well be a powerful influence in why some cities grow and develop 
one way versus another, in the medium-run of  thirty-to-fifty years (Boschma and 
Kloosterman, 2005; Rigby and Essletzbichler, 1997).  It is a difficult pill to swallow for those 
who formulate urban policy and want to predict the outcomes of their efforts and 
expenditures: there is a chance element in economic development. 
 On the other hand, the regularities may lie elsewhere.  In order to be a candidate city in 
the first place, certain conditions must be satisfied.  In the case of first-mover advantages of 
the type we are considering here, these conditions are likely to come from institutions, but not 
of the sector-specific type that have attracted the most attention in the high-tech and cluster 
literatures.  There are still-undiscovered attributes of institutions that seem to prepare city-
regions to attract new activities and sustain those that are getting started.  These may – indeed 
should – give rise to sector-specific institutional practices of the type Saxenian documents for 
Silicon Valley.  We do not know enough about these “institutions that capture first-mover 
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opportunities.”  The regularity should emerge when we study these  institutions: on average, 
the places that have them should capture more of whatever “new economy” exists at a given 
point in time than other places.  These places should have institutions that overcome existing 
problems – including existing interest-group practices for extracting rents, dominating 
perceptions, or blocking other groups from getting attention in political markets and labor 
markets.11 
 Long-term processes of economic development are not, thankfully, entirely dominated 
by first-mover advantages.  There are not enough such advantages to go around.  However, 
there are more opportunities that resemble them than is commonly realized.  The economy 
affords abundant  “second-mover” opportunities.  As sectors mature, they develop more 
complex internal divisions of labor, usually leading to the possibility of geographical 
fragmentation of the sector, and so the initial agglomerations, no matter how powerful, do not 
stop secondary clusters from emerging.  By this time, institutions of places – if they are good 
at adapting and problem-solving --  can apply more systematic lessons of the past to the 
process of imitation and capture --  assuming that their political structures allow them to adopt 
the correct policies.  In this way, economic development becomes less arbitrary and 
accidental.  An even more powerful opportunity for second-mover advantages comes through 
product differentiation and quality ladders (Grossman and Helpman, 1991).  Product 
differentiation and quality ladders are a basis for inter-place differentiation and competition, 
serving as a formidable opportunity-creating device. 
In order to prosper over the medium-run, city-regions need to do more than capture 
first- and second-mover opportunities.  They also need to solve problems in two major areas.  
On one hand,   they may attempt to retain existing activities by continuing to modernize them, 
and on the other they must cope with loss of activities. Such loss is inevitable when the 
                                                 
11
 Another example of institutional problem-solving that shapes and shifts the geography of an industry would be 
the finance sector in Venice-Amsterdam-London-New York from the 16th century onward.  
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evolution of organization and trade costs in a sector eliminate the options of retaining the 
industry at realistic ranges of regional factor prices. In this case, sectoral succession through 
first and second-mover specialization must replace the losses, or the economy moves 
downward in the hierarchy of incomes and employment. 
 International development economics suggests that institutions create the conditions 
within which regional economic actors can engage in this process (Rodrik, 2007).  One needs 
only to look at the success of the Japanese automobile industry today to see how important 
second-mover strategies can be to the economic geography of development, and how 
institutions do not transfer readily from place-to-place (Cusumano, 1985; Ellison et al, 
2002).12  The question is whether regions also do the same, since there is a strong national 
imprint to these institutions. How might institutions shape the “action systems” that seem to 
underpin specialization processes of capture, imitation, retention and adjustment/succession?   
If it is not accidents that cause them, then regional institutions may affect specialization 
through another of our growth theory variables, human capital, but in a very specific sense. 
The level of human capital is not enough.  Specialization through the construction of actor 
networks is very likely driven by the qualities of human capital, i.e. how well it is adapted to 
the specific needs of a sector of activity (Rosen, 1983). 
 The formation of human capital in a specific sector in the economy is a complex 
phenomenon that has been analyzed  extensively in economic sociology.  To simplify the 
argument: effective performance depends on skills,  whether acquired on the job or in 
educational institutions.  But acquiring and using skills also often depends on relationships, 
i.e. knowing where and with whom to acquire experience and develop further on the basis of 
existing skills (Granovetter, 1995).  Relationships also link individuals to opportunities, 
through networks.  Networks also allow for circulation of talent, and for exchange of 
                                                 
12
 In the sense that when Japan entered, they were a second-mover.  Subsequently, there is a case to be made that 
they have become the first-mover. 
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information that continuously improves skills.  Some networks have a strong interpersonal 
basis, or a combination of impersonal and interpersonal connections between individuals. In 
other words, “human capital” is really a “networked actor system” for the purposes of this 
analysis. So, people in the New York financial services cluster generally have very different 
networks from those in the Silicon Valley information technology cluster.  Thus, 
specialization is driven both by the level and the type of skill. 
Labor market networks are  “institutions” in and of themselves. They mix formal and 
informal elements, civil society, and formal governmental institutions (regulation, education, 
etc).  They should figure prominently in any effective account of a specific city’s economic 
history because they are the fundamental source of the “untraded interdependencies” that 
underpin agglomeration economies.   
The geographies of these networks are only partially understood, and what we do 
know of them indicates that – like many aspects of the regional economy – they have strong 
path dependencies, as well as many causes that are not specifically regional.  Thus, if we 
consider high-technology business networks, there are roots in institutions that pre-existed 
Silicon Valley, such as the military-industrial complex, and the national university and R&D 
system, as well as private companies in the predecessors to high-tech, such as the radio and 
television equipment industries. It’s difficult to imagine the perpetuation of specialization in 
Silicon Valley, New York, Hollywood, Paris or London or Milan without these sector-specific 
business and labor market networks, deeply intertwined with educational networks, that 
attract, convey skills to, and retain the people that are key to entrepreneurship and action in a 
particular industry.  
But path dependencies are not everything: Silicon Valley is the exemplar of spatial 
and organizational rupture with the past.  Specialization has to start somewhere, and it 
requires that we consider the causes/origins of the geography of these networks, as well as 
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why some effectively solve their problems and go on, while others disintegrate and, with 
them, the specialization they once supported.  
Regional institutions in a broader, less sector-specific sense, should logically have 
considerable – though perhaps indirect – influence on the formation of these networks, the 
type and level of human capital in the region, and hence its economic specialization.  What 
might these be?   Much of the urban politics literature, as noted,  concentrates on rent-
extracting behavior by regional elites, their dominance of the political process generally, and 
especially on their intentions with respect to land development (Molotch, 1976; Logan and 
Molotch, 1987).  But there is relatively little on non-land related growth coalitions.  The film 
industry in Southern California, the financial services industry in New York, and the high tech 
sector in the San Francisco Bay Area are only secondarily interested in land development.  In 
many countries, by contrast, regional political institutions are often more explicitly oriented 
toward organizing business activity “from above,” with a goal to furthering their specific ends 
through a variety of public policies.  A lot of ink gets spilled about programs put in place to 
strengthen particular industry clusters in regions.  But in the end, we have little hard evidence 
on the effect that these regional sector-specific elite strategies have on the formation and 
geography of these networks, and how they affect the dynamics of capture, retention and 
adjustment of specializations.   Take the example of Silicon Valley: perhaps the institutional 
entrepreneurs at Stanford, or perhaps accidents, set in motion the creation of agglomeration 
processes of individuals, which in turn led to the creation of wide and deep networks of 
innovators, which in turn subsequently supported strengthening the agglomeration, and so on. 
The problem is that no systematic tests of this type of sequences exist in the literature, at least 
that are known to this author.  
Moreover, even if starting points for networks/human capital/agglomeration lie in 
unique events or unique individuals, one asks whether there is a wider logic to why these 
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individuals did what they did where they did it.  Did the Dean of the Stanford Business 
School, for example, go west because in the East he felt unable to be entrepreneurial?  In this 
case, was there something about the institutional environment that was propitious to the 
application of his talents in a particular place?   
Finally, leadership may get something started, but it can wither on the vine if it is not 
appropriately nourished.  There are many examples in the history of innovation where 
superior ideas do not get implemented because they do not find a favorable environment 
(Mokyr, 1990; North, 2005)  These environments should have some regularities we can 
understand: institutions, not unique genius or pure individual strategy. 
 
The structure of institutions and the regional policy process 
 In the preceding discussion, we have concentrated on how economic opportunities 
may intersect with strategic institutional outputs of regional politics.  This opens up the 
natural question as to why regions “do” different things in this domain.  No complete answer 
could ever be proposed for such a question, but there is one dimension that emerges from the 
recent institutions and growth literature – and which intersects with a classical literature in 
urban politics and governance – that can be suggested as an important topic for research.  It 
concerns the geography of political jurisdictions in regions and they ways they may influence 
voice and coalition-creation in regions, and hence affect policy agendas. 
The urban environment is one that differs from “normal” factor  markets in an 
economy:  it involves spatial interdependency (externalities) and “bundling” (to locate in a 
place you take a package of things, which you cannot separate) (Storper and Manville, 2006).  
This gives rise to one of the principal specific qualities of the urban realm:  the tendency for 
households and business to use locational decisions to optimize their benefits, often by 
choosing jurisdictions within the fragmented multi-jurisdictional space of the metropolitan 
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region.  These “Tiebout-Schelling” dynamics of choice, often involving a tendency for 
households and businesses to seek out others who are like them, give rise to a strong 
mechanism of spatial-sorting or self-segregation, and hence a complex mosaic of difference 
within the diversified metropolis (Tiebout, 1957; Heikkla, 1996; Kenyon, 1997; Kenyon and 
Kincaid, 1991; Schelling, 1978).   
Smaller jurisdictions are likely to have populations with more homogeneous 
preferences and lower costs of debate and compromise, allowing more initiatives to see the 
light of day; however, they sometimes need cross-jurisdictional bridging for regional policies 
or investments with strongly positive scale economies (Alesina and Spolaore, 2005; Aghion, 
Alesina and Trebbi, 2005).  On the other hand, regions with a centralized  institutions may 
have problems with overly-heterogeneous preferences, but can be very efficient at region-
wide decisions.  Their challenge is decentralizing a certain part of the decision-
making/political process. This reasoning leads to the hypothesis that the “worst of all worlds” 
in terms of the de jure structure of decision-making would be to have neither the 
responsiveness that allows new initiatives to come up from the bottom, nor the centralization  
that allows large-scale regional compromises to be forged (cf.  Rose-Ackerman, 1983; 
Stiglitz, 1983).  In systems that combine too much bigness without centralization, the bigness 
of the units usually blocks initiatives, while fragmentation blocks cooperation among large 
rival units, or even worse, when there is one unit big enough to go it alone without all the 
others, but not big enough to achieve region-wide compromises. This is a condition of 
standoff or blockage:  
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We can think about this in relation to the principal domains of local-regional “hard” power – 
land use and public investments, and “soft power” (i.e. more general measures to affect 
regional business climate and quality of life).  The fragmented de jure structure will, all other 
things being equal, allow for a competition of ideas and approaches among a greater number 
of more homogeneous jurisdictions.  This could allow a number of them to do everything 
wrong, but will also allow many do  things “right” through the grouping together of people 
who share such preferences  -- elites and others.  The prospect of severe segregation is always 
strongly present in such a system, as well as failing to achieve regional coordination where 
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it’s necessary.  But the competition from successful places creates a higher probability that 
public collective action could suggest the “high road” to other jurisdictions and drag them 
along (also because successful places generate more tax revenues), and that this will, in turn, 
create a general “upward path” in the dynamics of regional labor market signaling and 
attraction.    The balance of outcomes is not determined by the de jure structure, but by the 
interplay of real sorting dynamics and the de facto politics that occurs within these 
jurisdictionally-sorted units and between them.  
 At the other extreme, a highly centralized metropolis, where there is a dominant 
jurisdiction (city or county in the US context), faces different dynamics. On the one hand, it 
has the heterogeneous preferences problem in  its big central jurisdiction; but on the other, 
when this jurisdiction wants to do something big, it can. Hence, there will be a bias toward 
certain kinds of big projects, and a tendency for many little ones to get shoved under the rug – 
unless there are political innovations within the big unit, that combine centralization and 
decentralization(one thinks of the role of New York City in the NY metro area).  It’s also 
conceivable that a strong elite bias gets displayed, if the hegemonic jurisdiction has 
powerfully organized elites. These elites can, of course, be more or less intelligent when it 
comes to foresight and problem-solving, so performance can be highly variable.  Land use 
and public investment decisions can, in any case, be powerfully directed toward strong effects 
on the conditions for labor market/business network formation and sustenance, and hence on 
specialization. Centralized metropolitan institutions can also fall prey to predatory elites who 
use centralization for short-term interests and drive specialization down the wrong pathway.   
 A more problematic case lies between these extremes, of a metropolis with a de jure 
institutional structure which is neither fragmented among equals, nor centered on a hegemon.  
It may contain some big units, but that are not hegemonic --- thus denying it both the 
advantages of centralization and those of smallness and homogeneous preferences.  The risk 
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is that it stifles the expression of land use and public investment projects that express either 
“many flowers blooming” as in the first case (and hence creative competition within the metro 
area) or powerful “big time projects” as in the second.  It may be rudderless: Los Angeles 
comes to mind.  The City of Los Angeles is not as proportionally powerful in its metro area as 
New York in its, but it’s big enough to stop almost any wider regional initiative.  Los Angeles 
County is huge (9.5 million persons) and heterogeneous, but not sufficiently piloted by its 
central city (3.8 million) for the latter to be able to impose its will on its neighboring counties.  
LA is neither an elite-dominated metropolis like New York, nor an internally fragmented, 
competitive-cooperative metropolis like San Francisco (Abu-Lughod, 1999; Jaher, 1982; Keil, 
2000).13  The result is that there is possibly the worst of both worlds, with little possibility for 
creative initiatives to get support, but with elites that are also disorganized.  The low road 
tends to prevail in this case:  with ineffective public investments, increasingly segregated 
private land use decisions, and no strong incentives to create broad problem-solving coalitions 
(Purcell, 2000).  As even the highly skilled have little regional power, they increasingly self-
segregate.  In the rest of the regional space, with their withdrawal and the absence of effective 
coalition action, the door is open to a “low road” of economic development, because of the 
failure to mobilize resources to drive specialization favorably. 14 
 
Conclusion 
 I have made an admittedly complex argument here, but the subject seems to require 
complexity.  Thus far, using simpler concepts of what makes certain cities grow one way and 
others another way have not established much that is convincing about specific urban growth 
pathways. Yet policymakers spend huge amounts of money and attention promising to do 
                                                 
13
 But LA certainly was an elite-dominated metropolis until the 1980s, when there was a tide of community 
mobilization and fragmentation of the regional elites (Fogelson, 1993). 
14
 Thus, whereas the per capita income of the five-county Los Angeles metropolitan area was 93% that of the 
San Francisco ten county metropolitan area in 1970, in 2004 it was only 68%. 
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something about them, and suggesting they know how to affect these pathways in a positive 
way.  In light of this considerable gap between political action and scientific knowledge of the 
subject, serious reconstruction of the frameworks we use to carry out research on metropolitan 
growth and development may well be merited. 
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